1

Open public consultation - Disincentives for advisors and intermediaries for potentially aggressive tax planning schemes

Please note: In order to ensure a fair and transparent consultation process only responses received through our online questionnaire will be taken into account and included in the report summarising the responses. Should you have a problem completing this questionnaire or if you require particular assistance, please contact: TAXUD-UNIT-D2@ec.europa.eu

The general rules on personal data protection on the EUROPA website are accessible here.

Important notice: this document is a staff working paper of D.G. Taxation and Customs for discussion and consultation purposes. This document does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission and should not be interpreted as a commitment by the Commission to any official initiative in this area.

1.1

Introduction

Recent public discussions have shown the crucial role that certain intermediaries play in facilitating tax avoidance and tax evasion. At international level, the OECD issued in 2015 a set of best practices as regards the use and promotion of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes (Final Report on BEPS Action 12).
This consultation aims to gather views on whether there is a need for EU action aimed at introducing more effective disincentives for intermediaries or tax payers engaged in operations that facilitate tax evasion and tax avoidance and in case there is, how it should be designed.

Tackling tax avoidance and evasion is among the political priorities in the EU, with a view to creating a deeper and fairer single market. In this context, the Commission has presented in the last years a number of initiatives in order to promote a fairer tax system. Enhancing transparency is one of the key pillars in the Commission's strategy to combat tax evasion and avoidance. In particular the automatic exchange of information between tax administrations [here: link to external doc on DAC] is crucial in order to provide those with the necessary information to exercise their duties efficiently.

The Panama Papers have highlighted how certain intermediaries appear to have actively helped their clients to conceal money offshore. Whilst some complex transactions and corporate structures may have entirely legitimate purposes, it is also clear that some activities, including offshore structures, may be less legitimate and in some cases illegal.

A number of taxpayers use shell companies registered in tax havens and appoint nominee directors to conceal their wealth and income by hiding the identity of the real owners of the companies (beneficial owners). Different and complex structures are used so as to create distance between the beneficial owners from their wealth also to ensure low or no taxation.

Taxpayers are rarely experts on company or tax law in the tax jurisdictions used for these structures. They usually rely on intermediaries who assist them in the design of the most appropriate structure. These intermediaries include among others consultants, lawyers, financial (investment) advisors, accountants, solicitors, financial institutions, insurance intermediaries, and company-formation agents.

Given the nature of tax avoidance and tax evasion, the impact on total tax loss is difficult to measure. Many schemes used by taxpayers include the creation of a complex structure, often involving a company located in a low tax jurisdiction. The Commission Staff Working Document on Corporate Income Taxation in the European Union as well as the Commission Staff Working Document for the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package provided evidence of profit shifting and base erosion practices. A recent study commissioned by the European Parliamentary Research Service ("Bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the European Union") found that revenue loss from profit shifting within the EU amounted to about EUR 50-70 billion in 2013. The UK reported that the overall cost of tax avoidance was GBP 2.7 billion in 2013-14 ("Measuring tax gaps 2015 edition").
Several calls have been made for the EU to take the lead in this field. The European Parliament has called for tougher measures against intermediaries who assist in tax evasion schemes. Following discussions at the informal ECOFIN Council of 22 April 2016, the Dutch Presidency invited the Commission to consider initiatives on Mandatory Disclosure Rules inspired by OECD BEPS Action 12, with a view to introducing more effective disincentives for intermediaries who assist in tax evasion schemes. In the May Council conclusions on the Commission Communication on External strategy and the Commission Recommendation on implementing measures against tax treaty abuse, the Council has invited “the Commission to consider legislative initiatives on Mandatory Disclosure Rules inspired by Action 12 of the OECD BEPS [here: link to external doc BEPS 12] project with a view to introducing more effective disincentives for intermediaries who assist in tax evasion or avoidance schemes”.

The Communication on further measures to enhance transparency and the fight against tax evasion and avoidance outlines the Commission’s assessment of the priority areas for action in the coming months, at EU and international level, to strengthen the fight against tax evasion and avoidance. Increasing oversight of intermediaries is one of the elements of that assessment. As indicated in the Communication, the Commission believes that there is a strong case for introducing further measures which specifically focus on those who promote or enable tax evasion and avoidance schemes. The key objectives should be:

- Dissuade intermediaries and users of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes from promoting and using them to the detriment of society.
- Ensure that national tax authorities have timely access to relevant information on such schemes.
- Avoid distortions in the single market due to diverging reporting requirements as regards such schemes so as to ensure a level playing field amongst intermediaries.
- Facilitate administrative cooperation between tax authorities to tackle cross-border abuse.
- Improve taxpayer voluntary compliance by introducing reassurances on the fairness of the system.

To date, tax legislation has focused on rules in order to ensure that taxpayers pay their taxes. The most recent measures adopted in the EU aim to ensure that corporate taxpayers operating cross border do not benefit from the loopholes or mismatches arising from the application of the different tax legislations of multiple jurisdictions. However, little has so far been done to introduce disincentives for those intermediaries that help, assist or advise taxpayers in the design of the adequate structure to facilitate tax evasion or avoidance.

1.2 

Purpose of this consultation
This consultation aims to gather views on whether there is a need for EU action aimed at introducing more effective disincentives for intermediaries engaged in operations that facilitate tax evasion and tax avoidance and in case there is, how it should be designed.

This consultation wants to gather views in particular on the following:

- Need for EU action.
- The different options identified, in case EU action is appropriate.
- The key design features of a possible disclosure regime.

The results of the public consultation will be duly published, together with the responses provided.

This consultation might be complemented by further targeted consultations with Member States, experts, professional associations, think tanks and others.

1.3

Glossary

**Aggressive tax planning (see also: Tax planning):** In the Commission Recommendation on aggressive tax planning, aggressive tax planning is defined as “taking advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability. Aggressive tax planning can take a multitude of forms. Its consequences include double deductions (e.g. the same loss is deducted both in the state of source and residence) and double non-taxation (e.g. income which is not taxed in the source state is exempt in the state of residence)”.

A distinction should be made between schemes that could be deemed as aggressive tax planning and ordinary tax planning. Aggressive tax planning results in an abuse of the tax system while ordinary tax planning allows taxpayers to exercise their legitimate interests to plan their tax affairs according to the national tax rules of their state of residence. Indeed, some Member States explicitly permit all taxpayers in a similar situation to use products and investment vehicles which have tax advantages and as such these are not considered to be aggressive tax planning schemes as they are not used to circumvent the spirit of the legislation. The scope of aggressive tax planning should therefore not include such schemes.

**Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS Project):** Tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid. The OECD has developed specific actions to give countries the tools they need to ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities generating the profits are performed and where value is created, while at the same time giving enterprises greater certainty by reducing disputes over the application of international tax rules, and standardising requirements. More information on the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project can be found here.
Confidentiality clause: A "confidentiality clause" is a contractual clause that requires the intermediary and/or the client to keep the scheme confidential.

Hallmarks: In this context, a typical characteristic or feature of an aggressive tax planning scheme. In the BEPS Report, hallmarks are divided into two categories: generic and specific hallmarks.

Generic hallmarks target features that are common to promoted schemes, such as the requirement for confidentiality or the payment of a premium fee. Generic hallmarks can also be used to capture new and innovative tax planning arrangements that may be easily replicated and sold to a variety of taxpayers. Specific hallmarks are used to target known vulnerabilities in the tax system and techniques that are commonly used in tax avoidance arrangements such as the use of losses.

Intermediaries who assist in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes: For the purpose of this questionnaire, the term "intermediaries who assist in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes" refers to any natural or legal person responsible for the design, marketing, organization or management of a potentially aggressive tax planning scheme, or who provides assistance or advice with respect to creating, developing, planning, organizing, marketing or implementing such a scheme. The term includes consultants, lawyers, financial (investment) advisors, accountants, solicitors, insurance intermediaries, financial institutions, and company-formation agents known as Trust and Company Service Providers.

Premium fee: A "premium fee" is a fee payable to the intermediary that is to a significant extent attributable to the tax advantage, or to any extent contingent upon obtaining that tax advantage.

Tax avoidance: According to the OECD glossary of tax terms, tax avoidance is defined as the arrangement of a taxpayer’s affairs in a way that is intended to reduce his or her tax liability and that although the arrangement may be strictly legal is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to follow.

Tax evasion: According to the OECD glossary of tax terms, tax evasion is defined as illegal arrangements where the liability to tax is hidden or ignored. This implies that the taxpayer pays less tax than he or she is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or information from the tax authorities.

Tax planning (see also: Aggressive tax planning): According to the OECD glossary of tax terms, tax planning is an arrangement of a person’s business and/or private affairs in order to minimize tax liability.

Importance notice on the publications of responses

Contributions received are intended for publication "as submitted". Below, you have the possibility to indicate whether you agree to the publication of your individual responses under your name or anonymously. Furthermore, the European Commission will prepare a synopsis report summarising all responses received (including responses anonymised upon request).
Do you agree to your contribution being published?
- Yes, I consent to all of my answers being published under my name.
- Yes, I consent to all of my answers/personal data being published anonymously.

Do you declare that the information you provide in your response to this consultation is not subject to copyright restrictions?
- The information provided is not subject to copyright restrictions.
- The information provided is subject to copyright restrictions.

General information about you

1. Are you replying as or on behalf:
- Private citizen
- Company - other than the categories offered below
- Law firm, tax consultancy, tax advisor
- Financial institution
- Trade/business/professional association
- Academic institution, Think Tank
- Non-govermental organisation, consumer association
- Public authority, public institutions, including national or regional parliaments
- Other

2. Please indicate your name, or the name of your company, organisation or institution for which you respond to this consultation.

KPMG Member Firms in the EU

3. Please indicate your email-address.
(Optional)

christopher.scott@kpmg.co.uk

4. In case we have questions regarding answers or remarks you have provided, can we contact you?
- Yes.
- No.
5. Where do you live, or where is the headquarter of your company or organisation (main headquarters in case of multinational companies), or where is your public authority located?

Other

If other country, please specify:

The replies are given on behalf of KPMG member firms located in the EU forming part of KPMG’s Europe, the Middle East & Africa (EMA) region

6. Is your organisation or the entity you represent included in the EU Transparency Register? (More information on the Transparency Register can be found here.)

☐ Yes

☐ No

* Please indicate your Register ID number

65515368730-59

7. Please indicate the size of your company in terms of current number of employees.

☐ 1 - 9 employees, incl. self-employed

☐ 10 - 49 employees

☐ 50 - 249 employees

☐ 250 or more employees

8. Please indicate the size of your company in terms of either the annual turnover, or the balance sheet total, whichever you consider more relevant. (This information is needed solely for the purpose to distinguish small and medium sized companies from large ones among the respondents.)

☐ less than EUR 50 million

☐ EUR 50 million or more

3.1

Receiving and using professional tax advice
1. Do you (or the entity you represent) receive professional tax advice?

- Yes.
- No.
- I don’t know.

4. Would you consider yourself (or the entity you represent) to be a user of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes?
(See the glossary for a definition of "potentially aggressive tax planning scheme".)

- Yes.
- No.
- I don’t know.

3.2

Providing professional tax advice

1. Do you (or the entity you represent) provide professional tax advice?

- Yes.
- No.
- I don’t know.

2. When providing advice on tax planning schemes, do you (or the entity you represent) maintain contacts with the tax authorities to discuss the terms of the scheme?

- Yes.
- No.
Please describe the practice and indicate whether there is room for negotiation with the tax authorities.

5000 character(s) maximum

This does depend on the country concerned, client consent and the circumstances. KPMG’s Global Tax Principles state: “We support a relationship with tax authorities aimed at building mutual trust and respect which will enable constructive dialogue and responsiveness by all parties, facilitate compliance and reduce or assist in early resolution of disputes” (see link below).

As regards Question 3 below, the definition of aggressive tax planning is so wide that it could be read to cover even simple cases of advising on the differences between national legislation. For example, advising on the fact that, according to clear government policy, preference share dividends are tax deductible in some countries while the receipt is not taxed in others. Therefore, read literally, any advisor providing cross-border advice may have to answer the question “Yes”. The Consultation cannot be intended to achieve this result. We consider that, as “Aggressive tax planning” involves “taking advantage...” of rules, it requires misusing them in some way. KPMG has a set of Global Principles (https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/campaigns/2015/01/tax-transparency-morality.html) which sets out our approach to tax planning and which we believe demonstrates we do not “take advantage” of rules in this way. We also note that when any MDR rule is in force it is likely that the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives I and II and the OECD Multilateral Instrument will also be in force and that the combination of all these measures will reduce the incidence of cross-border mismatches. While KPMG will, where appropriate, continue to give objective advice to clients in cases where different systems treat the same item differently, we consider that this is not “Aggressive tax Planning” as the advice reflects the fact of differing government policy. We have therefore answered the question below “no”. More generally, given the importance and complexity of the issues involved, in addition to responding directly to the questionnaire in this consultation, we are providing further comments and explanations in a separate paper that can be found here https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/02/kpmg-position-paper-on-disincentives-for-advisors-and-intermediaries-for-potentially-aggressive-tax-planning-schemes.pdf.

* 3. Would you consider yourself (or the entity you represent) to be an intermediary for potentially aggressive tax planning schemes?

See the glossary for a definition of "intermediary" and "potentially aggressive tax planning scheme".

- Yes.
- No.
- I don't know.
Your opinion on the objectives of the policy initiative

4.1 Classification of "potentially aggressive tax planning schemes"

1. In your view, how useful are the following criteria to classify tax schemes as potentially aggressive?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Not useful at all</th>
<th>Of limited use, e.g. only in combination with other criteria</th>
<th>Very useful</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confidentiality clause (See glossary)</td>
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<td>Premium fee (See glossary)</td>
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<td>Use of jurisdictions included in the (future) EU list of third country jurisdictions that fail to comply with tax good governance standards.</td>
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<td>Use of certain legal arrangement/entities (trusts and similar) in jurisdictions that pose difficulties to identifying the beneficial owner.</td>
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<td><strong>Use of entities subject to zero taxation or less than a certain % (to be defined), including hybrid entities (i.e. entities that are treated as transparent by one country but as non-transparent by another country).</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Schemes designed to circumvent the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for automatic exchanges of financial account information.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Use of a group company in a low tax jurisdiction for intra-group financing of other group companies in high tax jurisdictions.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Use of group companies with very little substance that are nevertheless entitled to tax treaty benefits and through which large amounts of money flow.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>A general artificial arrangement or an artificial series of arrangements created for the essential purpose of avoiding or evading taxation and which leads to a tax benefit.</strong></td>
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</table>
Please elaborate on other or additional criteria you would consider useful for the classification of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes.

5000 character(s) maximum

Our replies are necessarily generic as we are answering on a pan-EU basis and not in relation to any particular country. It may be, for example, that a confidentiality agreement is a very strong indicator in a particular country and not at all in others. We therefore believe there needs to be a discussion with each tax authority to identify particular risks under local law and the required hallmarks. We also note the question about entities with zero tax or hybrids confuses two different issues while the question about artificial arrangements is more of a definition of avoidance than a hallmark. Consequently it is difficult to give an answer to these questions given the options to respond.
2. Should any tax planning scheme relating to countries appearing on the EU's (future) list of third country jurisdictions that fail to comply with tax good governance standards automatically qualify as a potentially aggressive tax planning scheme?

- Yes.
- No.
- No opinion/I don't know.
- Other.

4.2 Objectives of the policy initiative
3. To what extent do you agree with the following objectives to strengthen the fight against tax evasion and avoidance?

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<tr>
<td><strong>Dissuade intermediaries and users of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes from using them.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Ensure that national tax authorities have timely access to relevant information on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Avoid distortions in the single market due to diverging reporting requirements as regards potentially aggressive tax planning schemes so as to ensure a level playing field amongst the different intermediaries.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Facilitate administrative cooperation between tax authorities to tackle cross-border abusee.</strong></td>
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</table>
*Improve voluntary compliance of taxpayers by introducing reassurances on the fairness of the system.

Other or additional objective to strengthen the fight against tax avoidance and evasion.
Please elaborate on additional or other objectives to strengthen the fight against tax evasion and avoidance.

5000 character(s) maximum

We consider that a Mandatory Disclosure Regime (MDR) is not suitable to address evasion as this is something materially different from avoidance. Evasion is a criminal offence and involves dishonestly hiding or misrepresenting information. If a taxpayer (or adviser) is engaging in evasion it is unlikely they would disclose the information under an MDR. Evasion should be dealt with under existing regulations such as anti-money laundering rules and the CRS. If necessary, a separate project focusing on evasion should be commenced.

4. Should a potential EU policy initiative focus on those potentially aggressive tax planning schemes only when there is a cross-border aspect, or should it address any aggressive tax planning scheme irrespective of the location of the different elements? (A cross border element would imply that for instance the taxpayer or client of tax advice, any of the tax advisors or any of the legal entities are resident in different Member States. Likewise, cross-border elements could be any arrangement or transaction of the tax scheme that is carried out in more than one Member State.)

- A potential EU policy initiative should address any aggressive tax planning scheme, irrespective of the cross-border aspect.
- A potential EU policy initiative should focus only on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes that include cross-border elements.
- No opinion/I don't know.
- Other opinion
Please explain the rationale for your answer

5000 character(s) maximum

We consider the principle of subsidiarity means the regime is best introduced at the national level. Furthermore, differences in national legislation will make it difficult to introduce an effective and efficient “one size fits all” pan EU MDR. A possible exception would be if the national rules did not pick up certain cross-border planning in which case a focused cross-border EU regime may be appropriate.

5. Currently, only a small number of EU national tax authorities receive information on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes. In your view, should tax authorities in all Member States be made aware of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes? Please explain the rationale for your answer.

- Yes, Member States should be made aware of any potentially aggressive tax planning scheme.
- Yes, Member States should be made aware of potentially aggressive tax planning scheme if they are applied within their jurisdiction.
- No.
- No opinion/I don’t know.
- Other opinion.
6. In your view, **should national tax authorities share information** on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes with tax authorities of other EU Member States?

- **Yes**, information should be **shared in any case**.
- **Yes**, information should be **shared with all Member States, but only if** the potentially aggressive tax planning scheme includes a **cross-border element**.
- **Yes**, information should be **shared, but only if** the potentially aggressive tax planning scheme includes a **cross-border element, and only with the Member State(s) concerned**.
- **No**.
- **No opinion/I don't know**.
- **Other opinion**

Please elaborate.
(Optional)

*5000 character(s) maximum*

As set out in our answers to Questions 4 and 5 above, we believe MDR should be a matter for national tax authorities to implement if they so wish.

7. In the fight against tax evasion and avoidance, do you think that the EU should **focus on the role of intermediaries** who assist in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes?

- **Yes**
- **No**
- **No opinion/Don't know**
- **Other**
5000 character(s) maximum

Yes – although we query whether disclosure rules will be necessary once all the current new anti-avoidance measures included in ATAD I & II are in place. Further, as discussed in responses to previous questions, we believe MDR should be introduced at the national level tailored to the specific laws of the country rather than at an EU level. We do not believe that an MDR is suitable to stop evasion because, by definition, this is a criminal activity relying on secrecy and dishonesty: taxpayers (or intermediaries) who try to dishonestly hide or misrepresent information on a tax return are not going to reveal it through a MDR. Evasion should be dealt with through existing measures such as anti-money laundering rules and CRS – which already apply to intermediaries.

5

Tax Transparency
1. In terms of tax transparency, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree very much</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree very much</th>
<th>No opinion /don’t know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Current EU legislation related to potentially aggressive tax planning schemes is sufficient. The EU should leave it to each Member State whether or not to implement the recommendation issued at international level by the OECD.</em></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Disagree Very Much" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Disagree" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Neutral" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Agree" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Agree Very Much" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="No Opinion/Don’t Know" /></td>
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</table>
The EU should implement the recommendations issued at international level by the OECD in a coordinated way in order to ensure a level playing field within the European Union.

The EU should implement the recommendations issued at international level by the OECD at the same pace and to the same extent as its global partners in order to ensure a level playing field.

The EU should be in the forefront in implementing the recommendations issued at international level.
We consider that the EU should recommend that Member States consider implementing BEPS Action 12 where relevant for them and in the most appropriate way. An EU wide MDR should be considered only if it appears that national rules alone would not cover certain cross-border structures within the EU which could fit into the category of aggressive tax planning.
2. In your view, **if no action was taken at EU level**, what would happen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very unlikely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Very likely</th>
<th>I don’t know.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>No transparency requirements</em> would be introduced in the majority of Member States.</td>
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<td><em>Differing transparency requirements would be introduced</em> in the different Member States.</td>
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<td><em>Most Member States would likely follow closely OECD standards.</em></td>
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<td>Other effects.</td>
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</table>
Please elaborate on the "other effects".

5000 character(s) maximum

At present it is unclear to us if it would be “most” Member States which would introduce the rule. The number which do so should not be the most important way of judging the impact of BEPS Action 12 in the EU. What is important is that those Member States where it is relevant are able to introduce a regime which fits their needs and we believe those states which are concerned with aggressive tax planning will adopt rules without the EU needing to pass a directive. This also means that states which do not think such a rule is necessary would not have the administrative cost and burden of having to implement an EU wide scheme which would be of no or limited benefit to them.

5.1

Direct and indirect impacts
3. In your view, if **advisors and intermediaries** were obliged to report potentially aggressive tax planning schemes, what would be the **direct consequences**?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree completely</th>
<th>No opinion /don't know</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>A more focused enforcement action to ensure tax law compliance by national tax authorities by identifying the users of the schemes and the intermediaries who assist them.</em></td>
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</table>
- A more focused enforcement action to ensure tax law compliance by national tax authorities by providing timely information on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes.

- Dissuasive effect on intermediaries who assist in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes.

- Dissuasive effect on users of potentially aggressive tax schemes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution to improving voluntary tax law compliance in general by providing <strong>reassurances on the fairness</strong> of the taxation system.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Easier evaluation of national tax legislation with a view to <strong>detecting and addressing loopholes</strong> allowing for tax avoidance and evasion.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
*More effective cooperation between national tax authorities and thus rendering more difficult cross-border tax avoidance and evasion within the EU.*

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*Increased burden on providers of tax advice that would be harmful to their daily work.*

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28
4. In your view, **if advisors and intermediaries** were obliged to report potentially aggressive tax planning schemes, what would be the **indirect consequences**?
### Economic Impacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree completely</th>
<th>No opinion /don't know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>A better and fairer tax environment where all taxpayers pay their share of taxes.</em></td>
<td><img src="#" alt="Circle" /></td>
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<td><em>An increase on the taxes collected by tax authorities in the EU.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>An increase on the taxes collected by tax authorities outside the EU.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Impacts</td>
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<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree completely</td>
<td>No opinion/don't know</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deterrence of the use of aggressive tax planning schemes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tax authorities focus their efforts on wealthy taxpayers.</td>
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<td>Voluntary tax compliance by taxpayers will improve.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The increase of administrative burden and costs due to the new disclosure obligations will deter using potentially aggressive tax planning schemes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SMEs, competitiveness and innovation</strong></th>
<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree completely</th>
<th>No opinion / don't know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>SMEs will benefit from a level playing field as big enterprises will have fewer opportunities to use potentially aggressive tax schemes.</em></td>
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<td><em>An increased level playing field between all companies should result in increased competitiveness.</em></td>
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<td>*An increased level playing field between all companies should result in <strong>increased innovation</strong>.</td>
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<td>*Mandatory disclosure obligations will <strong>reduce the attractiveness of the EU Internal Market.</strong></td>
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<td>*EU Action would constitute a feature of a <strong>growth friendly environment</strong> and foster the <strong>attractiveness of the EU as a place to invest.</strong></td>
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</table>
### Public Administrations

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<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree completely</th>
<th>No opinion / don't know</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Mandatory disclosure requirements will increase administrative burden for public authorities.</em></td>
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<td><img src="no-mark" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td><img src="no-mark" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td><img src="yes" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td><img src="no-mark" alt="Symbol" /></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>The benefits of mandatory disclosure requirements will outweigh the burden to public administrations.</em></td>
<td><img src="no-mark" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td><img src="no-mark" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td><img src="yes" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td><img src="no-mark" alt="Symbol" /></td>
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<td>Third countries</td>
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<td><em>Decrease in the services provided by firms/professional located in the jurisdictions considered as non-cooperative jurisdictions to EU taxpayers.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Completely disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree completely</td>
<td>No opinion /don't know</td>
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</table>
Are there any other impacts you would like to indicate?

2000 character(s) maximum

Our answers in 3 and 4 above are predicated on any rules only being introduced at the national level on a needs be basis. If there was a “one size fits all” EU wide MDR it would be more likely to be inefficient and put an unwarranted administrative and cost burden of tax authorities as well as, potentially, on tax intermediaries and taxpayers.

6

Mandatory disclosure obligations

6.1 Existing mandatory disclosure obligations

* 1. In your national legislation, are there mandatory disclosure obligations for taxpayers involved in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes?

☐ No.
☐ Yes.
☐ I don’t know whether there exists such an obligation.

Please describe them and provide your opinion e.g. with regard to their effectiveness.

5000 character(s) maximum

There are existing rules in the UK, Ireland and Portugal, which are considered to have worked well in those countries. This suggests they should not now be overturned by a new EU wide rule.

* In your view, did the use of tax planning schemes change following the introduction of mandatory disclosure obligations for taxpayers?

☐ No.
☑ Yes, to some extent.
☐ Yes, to a large extent.
☐ I don’t know.
2. In your national legislation, are there mandatory disclosure obligations for intermediaries who assist in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes?

- No.
- Yes.
- I don't know whether there exists such an obligation.

Please describe them and provide your opinion e.g. with regard to their effectiveness.

5000 character(s) maximum

There are rules in the UK, Ireland and Portugal, which are considered to have worked well in those countries. This suggests they should not now be overturned by a new EU wide rule.

In your view, did tax advice practice change following the introduction of mandatory disclosure obligations for intermediaries?

- No.
- Yes, to some extent.
- Yes, to a large extent.
- I don't know.

Please provide further information.
(Optional)

5000 character(s) maximum
3. In your legislation, are intermediaires subject to a code of conduct or ethic rules on the use of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes?

- No.
- Yes.
- I don't know

In your view, would the introduction of a code of conduct or of ethic rules change tax advice practice?

- No.
- Yes, to some extent.
- Yes, to a large extent.
- I don't know.

Please provide further information.
(Optional)

There are no legislative codes of conduct or ethic rules as far as we are aware but, in some cases, such rules are prescribed by professional associations - see below. Given that taxpayers have the right to arrange their affairs according to law, that they need access to experts to understand their rights and obligations and that they have the right to legal representation, we do not consider there should be a legislative framework to control how advisers make decisions about tax planning and what is and what is not acceptable, especially if that were overseen by the tax authorities. Any code of conduct should be enforced by the relevant professional bodies.

Tax advice is provided by a range of professionals in different EU Member States including accountants, lawyers, qualified members of tax advisory bodies and former tax authority officials. In some countries there are no professional rules covering the giving of tax advice. In others, professional rules do exist and in the UK these (the Professional Conduct in Relation to Taxation) apply to a number of the tax professions but not to lawyers. Given the differences in the structure of the profession and in local law it may be very difficult to create one set of professional rules which would automatically cover all EU tax advisers. Further consideration should be given to the Commission consulting on producing a recommendation that the various professional bodies introduce a local code of conduct perhaps based on a pro forma set of principles.

6.2 Need and target of mandatory disclosure
4. Do you think that there is a need to impose mandatory disclosure obligations with respect to potentially aggressive tax planning schemes?

- No.
- Yes.
- No opinion/I don't know.
- Other.

Please explain the rationale for your answer.
(Optional)

* 5000 character(s) maximum

There should not be an EU MDR relating to planning which affects only one country. The principle of subsidiarity means that such a rule should be introduced at the Member State level. More consideration should be given to the need for an EU wide rule if it is considered there are aggressive cross-border planning structures which would not be picked up by national rules once national authorities have determined their response to the OECD recommendations (although we do note that existing rules such as in the UK do also cover cross-border planning).

* 5. Mandatory disclosure obligations on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes can require disclosure from taxpayers (the users) and/or intermediaries.

**Whom should a policy initiative oblige** to disclose the relevant information?

- **Taxpayers** who make use of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes, as defined in the glossary.
- **Intermediaries** who assist in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes, as defined in the glossary.
- **Both, taxpayers and intermediaries**, who make use or assist in potentially aggressive tax planning schemes.
- **Neither taxpayer nor intermediary**.
- No opinion/I don't know.
- Other opinion.
6. In some cases, there might not be any intermediary for tax planning, for instance when a tax planning scheme is developed “in house” of an enterprise. In other cases, intermediaries might not be subjected to mandatory disclosure obligation, as the intermediary is located in a non-EU Member State. In yet other cases, the intermediary might be unable or prohibited for other reasons to provide the relevant information. In such cases where no intermediary exists or where the intermediary can not be subjected to mandatory disclosure obligations, should in these cases the taxpayer be obliged to disclose the relevant information on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes, instead of the intermediary?

- No, the taxpayer should not be obliged to disclose the relevant information.
- Yes, in such cases the taxpayer should be obliged to disclose the relevant information.
- No opinion/I don't know.
- Other

Please explain the rationale of your answer

5000 character(s) maximum


6.3

Scope of mandatory disclosure

7. In your view, what information should be provided on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes? How useful would you consider the individual items?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification of the taxpayer (user of the potentially aggressive tax planning scheme)</th>
<th>Not useful at all</th>
<th>Not useful</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Useful</th>
<th>Very useful</th>
<th>I don't know</th>
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<td>*Identification of the intermediary</td>
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<td>*Details of the potentially aggressive tax planning scheme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>*Details of the provisions/hallmark that qualifies the tax planning scheme as potentially aggressive.</td>
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<td>*Statutory/regulatory provisions on which tax advantage is based.</td>
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<tr>
<td>*Identification of the different jurisdictions used in the scheme.</td>
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<td>*Description of the tax benefit or advantage.</td>
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<td>*Amount of the tax benefit or advantage.</td>
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<td>*Disclosure obligations only to intermediaries: List of clients advised /linked to the potentially aggressive tax planning scheme.</td>
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</table>
*Disclosure obligations only to intermediaries: Member States of residence of clients advised/linked to the potentially aggressive tax planning scheme.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Other or additional information</th>
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</table>

Please elaborate the other or additional information that you consider useful to be disclosed.

**5000 character(s) maximum**

As stated above, confidentiality/legal privilege rules would stop some intermediaries disclosing the client details and any MDR regime would need to take account of or address such matters.

7

Policy options and their impacts

POLICY OPTIONS AND THEIRIMPACTS

The European Commission identified in an Inception Impact Assessment the following possible options for policy initiatives:

**OPTION 0: No action at EU level**

**OPTION A: European Commission to encourage Member States to gather information on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes and to share/exchange it with other Member States**
The Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC) does not contain explicit provisions requiring Member States to collect and to exchange information with all the other Member States on tax evasion and tax avoidance schemes that come to their attention. However, the DAC contains a general obligation for tax authorities of EU Member States to spontaneously communicate information to the other EU tax authorities in certain circumstances, including the loss of tax in a Member State or savings of tax resulting from artificial transfers of profits within groups of companies (see article 9 of Council Directive 2011/16/EU). The Commission could encourage, through a non-legislative non-binding act, Member States to gather information on such schemes and to exchange it with other Member States when appropriate using the spontaneous exchange of information mechanism provided in the Directive on Administrative Cooperation.

**OPTION B: Require Member States to impose mandatory disclosure obligations on intermediaries and/or taxpayers when using or providing advice on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes**

There are different ways of introducing mandatory disclosure obligations. One could be through an amendment of Directive on Administrative Cooperation, which since 2014 also requires Member States to impose on financial institutions the obligation to report financial account information to tax authorities.

Another option could be to lay down these mandatory disclosure obligations under financial legislation regulating the behaviour of certain providers of tax advice or through a stand-alone provision that would apply horizontally to providers of tax advice. In case of financial institutions, the reporting could be done either directly to tax authorities or to supervision authorities, who would convey the information to tax authorities. To avoid the risk of creating an uneven playing field, this option should be carefully designed to ensure that all the relevant service providers are covered by the obligation.

**OPTION C: Require Member States to impose mandatory disclosure obligations on intermediaries and/or taxpayers when using or providing advice on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes and to automatically exchange the information with other Member States**

The Directive on Administrative Cooperation could be amended in order to (i) require Member States to impose on intermediaries an explicit mandatory disclosure obligation on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes to tax authorities and, (ii) to ensure that tax authorities automatically exchange this information with the tax authorities of other Member States, by using the mechanism provided in Directive on Administrative Cooperation.

**OPTION D: Mandatory disclosure (Option B) or Mandatory disclosure & Exchange of information (Option C) + Publication**

Another option would be to combine OPTION B or OPTION C with a requirement on certain taxpayers to publish (elements of or all) the information to be disclosed to Member States’ authorities, in order to add an additional element of public scrutiny.
**OPTION E: EU Code of Conduct for intermediaries**

To ensure that Member States, in cooperation with the Commission, take measures to encourage the drawing up at EU level of codes of conduct aimed at facilitating the provision of tax and legal advice services and establishing rules restricting the provision of potentially aggressive tax planning services that could facilitate tax avoidance or tax evasion.

Codes of conduct are regularly found in the sector of regulated professions and are normally adopted by the professional themselves; however they are not present in all Member States, and their nature, scope, and role differ.

A European code would have declaratory value. In order to guarantee its effectiveness, it would need to be transposed into the codes of conduct of the national professional associations - some of which have been approved by law. National professional organisations can monitor and act in the event of infringements by professionals of the provisions of the code.
1. In your view, which policy option is best suited for obtaining the objectives?

Please rate below how well each option would achieve the identified primary objectives (+ (plus) achieves the objective, 0 (zero) has no effect with respect to the objective, - (minus) runs counter to the objective)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Rating</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. No action at the EU level</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Encourage MS to use currently available exchange of information mechanisms (DAC)</td>
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<td>B. Reporting</td>
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<td>C. Reporting and Exchange of information</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Reporting (Option B) or Reporting and Exchange of information (Option C) + Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. EU Code of Conduct.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
In your view, how effective would the policy options be in terms of introducing disincentives for tax payers using and intermediaries assisting potentially aggressive tax planning schemes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
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<th>Of limited effectiveness</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
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<tr>
<td>Option A: Encourage Member States to use currently available exchange of information mechanisms</td>
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<td>Option B: Disclosure of information</td>
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<td>Option C: Disclosure and Exchange of information</td>
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<td><em>Option D:</em> Disclosure (Option B) or Disclosure and Exchange of Information (Option C) plus Publication</td>
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<td><em>Option E:</em> EU Code of Conduct</td>
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Additional information

Should you wish to provide additional information (e.g. a position paper, report) or raise specific points not covered by the questionnaire, you can upload your additional document(s) here.

Please upload your file
28d3e641-e389-4f3a-9b08-efbc8dec8b67/kpmg-position-paper-on-disincentives-for-advisors-and-intermediaries-for-potentially-aggressive-tax-planning-schemes.pdf

Contact
taxud-unit-d2@ec.europa.eu